ABSTRACT. In this paper we discuss the potential role capital markets will play in health care restructuring. According to theory, agency costs, asymmetric information and strategic interactions cause the cost of capital for nonprofit entities to slope upward. Freestanding nonprofits are particularly disadvantaged in this regard. We conclude that some organizational forms will be less viable due to problems of capital access. Empirical work examines the capital structure of nonprofit entities. Our results indicate that chain hospitals are able to access more debt, both taxable and tax-exempt, than freestanding hospitals. Capital markets also associate for profit market presence with capital risk. We conclude that freestanding hospitals are at a relative disadvantage is accessing capital markets.
INTRODUCTION
The restructuring of health care delivery is now an established business and economic trend. Recent years have witnessed a record number of health care consolidations, significant reductions in the staffs ________________ of acute care hospitals and unprecedented efforts to vertically integrate the delivery of services across the continuum of care. These efforts are motivated both by strategy and the pursuit of efficiency. Healthcare providers, especially acute care hospitals, are searching for new ways to increase their bargaining power vis a vis payers or, failing that, ways to gain a cost advantage relative to other providers in the marketplace.
While the aim of restructuring is clear, the role that nonprofit hospitals will play in a restructured environment is not. Under one scenario, most nonprofit hospitals will close and those that remain open will become commodity providers of acute care services, exercising little control over healthcare delivery. Under an alternative scenario, many nonprofit hospitals will successfully integrate services, including physician services, and will therefore continue to direct the flow of capital and expenditures within the system. A third possibility is that for profit chains of hospitals will take the lead in consolidating and integrating nonprofit hospitals, again consigning nonprofit providers to a diminished role in the healthcare sector. The role that nonprofit hospitals play in a restructured environment will be decided by the marketplace and the resolution of the matter will have important implications for the issues of access and quality.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of capital markets on hospital industry restructuring. We analyze four features of capital markets that will influence the relative likelihood of the scenarios outlined above. Each of these features affects the cost of capital to nonprofit hospitals, causing the cost of capital to rise sharply. This makes some restructuring plans infeasible as a result, making it more likely that for profit firms will direct the restructuring process. In the paper's empirical section, we provide evidence on the exogenous effects of affiliation and market structure on the equilibrium capital structures of nonprofit hospitals. These empirical results provide evidence on the cost of capital of these organizations and thus provides a test of our theory.
While the future structure of healthcare delivery has been the subject of a good deal of research and commentary, little has been written on the role that capital markets play in this process. To some degree, this reflects a view that capital markets merely ratify the decisions and performance of firms in the market. However, financial markets can play a role above and beyond the role of an impartial referee, to the extent that the standard assumptions of perfect capital markets fail to hold. Where capital markets are "perfect," characterized by full information and no transactions costs, organizations may obtain an unlimited supply of capital at a competitively-determined price. However, an elastic supply of capital will not be forthcoming where there are agency costs, risks of bankruptcy, information asymmetries or other contractual problems. For example, financial theory indicates that optimal firm leverage is limited to the extent that over-levered firms suffer agency costs associated with inefficient or risk seeking behaviors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Similarly, financial theory also holds that raising capital externally is more costly than using internal sources due to problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection that arise from information asymmetries (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Where borrower motives are in question, capital rationing may also result (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . Regarding the future role of nonprofit hospitals, the question is whether such imperfections are relevant in health care and whether they are likely to become more or less pronounced under restructuring.
Under one plausible set of assumptions, these questions can be answered in the affirmative. We will describe why markets composed of nonprofit providers and requiring capital investment for restructuring may exhibit acute problems of agency, adverse selection and moral hazard in raising capital finance. At one level, we relate these problems to the constraint nonprofits face in raising equity. However, at another level, the problems can also be tied to the barriers to capital exit that nonprofit providers face and the way in which capital markets rationally interpret their efforts to raise new capital. Most importantly, these problems may tilt the competitive balance in favor of for profit or chain providers.
There are other factors, in addition to informational problems, that also affect the access and cost of capital to healthcare providers. Nonprofit hospitals cannot use equity markets to raise capital, which may cause their cost of capital to grow rapidly if they become too highly leveraged. On the other hand, access to tax-exempt bond financing lowers their cost of debt and helps to offset this problem. Finally, the economic rivalry between nonprofit and for profit organizations will also cause capital markets to reevaluate the terms under which they are willing to provide capital to nonprofit healthcare providers. In each case, these factors affect the cost of capital schedule facing the organization. This, in turn, affects the organization's ability to carry out a plan of restructuring.
Below, we develop these points both theoretically and empirically. In the next section, we provide a more thorough discussion of the capital market features discussed above and relate them to the restructuring process. This is followed by some preliminary evidence on the capital access issue obtained by examining the financing patterns of chain and nonchain hospitals in two different states at different points in time. The paper concludes with a short discussion.
THEORY

Overview
In this section, we explore the various ways in which capital markets determine the cost of capital to hospitals and other healthcare providers. Our aim is two-fold: (1) to provide a thorough discussion of four features of capital markets that influence an organization's cost of capital schedule, and (2) to then provide a general explanation of how the cost of capital schedule may inhibit the restructuring plans of some hospitals. At the close of the section, we review the implications of our discussion for the future structure of the hospital industry focusing on (1) the viability of hospitals that serve Medicaid and uninsured populations, (2) the extent of hospital affiliation with regional or national chains and (3) the extent of for profit versus nonprofit health care provision.
Institutional Features Affecting the Cost of Capital of Nonprofit Providers
Our discussion starts with a review of two institutional features that impact the cost of capital to nonprofit providers. They are (1) constraints against raising equity finance and (2) access to tax-exempt bond financing.
Constraints/Costs of Raising Equity Finance
One of the defining financial features of nonprofit organizations is their inability to raise equity finance, except through the retention of profits or through donations. External sources of equity finance, through new share issuance or share dilution (relevant in the case of mergers) are foreclosed to nonprofit entities. In healthcare, moreover, donations have provided a limited flow of equity funding in recent years (Sloan, Hoerger, Morrisey and Hassan, 1990 ). For profit firms, which can issue shares or reduce dividends, are not constrained in this respect.
The equity constraint is significant, because it causes a convexity in the nonprofit hospital's cost of capital schedule. While it is true that nonprofit entities can access debt financing where equity sources are exhausted, the extent of leverage is limited by considerations of bankruptcy and agency costs. For example, hospitals that are highly levered may undertake inefficient and risky strategies because their potential failure is likely to be borne by bondholders. Moral hazard problems of this type grow with the extent of leverage. This is the basis of the general theory of optimal capital structure and limits on debt financing (Harris and Raviv, 1991) . Moreover, Wedig, Sloan, Hassan, and Morrisey (1988) and Wedig, Hassan and Morrisey (1996) have provided both theoretical and empirical support for a theory of costly debt financing in nonprofit hospitals. Their theories and evidence also indicate that the cost of debt financing for nonprofit entities is an increasing and convex function of the total level of funds borrowed.
Capital constraints of this nature are less significant where capital requirements are modest, limited to the replacement of plant and moderate levels of asset growth. However, where larger sums of capital are needed for restructuring, the increasing cost of capital schedule becomes a significant constraint on plans to restructure.
It should be noted that the nature of this constraint and its ultimate effect is a direct function of different organizations' abilities to raise equity finance in a cost efficient way. A natural hierarchy exists in this regard. Freestanding nonprofit organizations are likely to be the most equity and hence capital constrained. Their cost of capital schedules are likely to curve upward at the lowest levels of capital acquisition. Nonprofit hospitals belonging to chains are somewhat less constrained. Chains enjoy the luxury of shifting capital and risk across member organizations even if they cannot issue shares. Their schedules remain horizontal over a greater range of capital investment. Finally, for profit healthcare organizations are the least equity constrained, with larger for profit organizations enjoying an even greater advantage.
Access to Tax-Exempt Bonds
A second institutional determinant of the cost of capital schedule for nonprofit organizations is regulatory in nature. Nonprofit hospitals, which suffer competitive disadvantages in accessing equity markets, can offset this disadvantage by using tax-exempt bonds. Tax-exempt bonds have yields that are anywhere from two to three hundred basis points below the yields on taxable bonds of similar risk and duration (Grossman, Goldman, Nesbitt and Mobilia, 1993) . Nonprofit organizations qualify for this form of finance because they are 501(c)3 organizations.
The effects on the cost of capital schedule are infra-marginal in nature. Tax exempt financing options do not increase the extent of debt capacity nor the convexity of the cost of capital schedule. Instead, they reduce the average interest costs associated with any degree of leverage. The principal effect is to reduce interest expense and increase the level of disposable income for the organization. The interest savings associated with tax-exempt finance can be a source of added equity over time. This equity, if leveraged, may be a significant source of added capital in the long run.
Some nonprofit organizational forms may enjoy better access tax-exempt debt than others. Tax-exempt financing requires the participation of a government conduit that, in theory, can place conditions on its participation. For example, in California the state bond financing authority closely monitors participation in the state's Medicaid program as well as the extent of uncompensated care in those hospitals with tax-exempt debt. Hassan, Wedig and Morrisey (1996) explore the effects of tax-exempt debt on hospitals' charity care flows and find a positive relationship. This suggests that hospitals' access to tax-exempt bonds may improve with its level of Medicaid participation or charity care level. We explore this possibility in the latter part of the paper.
Industrial Organization and the Cost of Capital: Effects of For Profit Entry into the Market
As a third influence on the cost of capital, we consider the possible interaction between for profit and nonprofit providers. The simple question we pose here is the following: to what extent does the presence of for profit providers in a local market affect the cost of capital for nonprofit providers? We hypothesize that the influence of for profit providers on nonprofit capital structure occurs because of the market competition between these two forms of ownership.
Previously, Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988) explored the relationships between capital structure and market structure. Brander and Lewis demonstrate that low leverage may constitute a strategic advantage and that attempts to gain this advantage may, in turn, influence capital structure. For example, where strategic interactions are characterized by intense rivalry, organizations may reduce leverage in order to maintain the ability to withstand lower prices, etc. This means that the cost of debt financing is assigned a higher cost in the presence of these rivalries.
These arguments apply in the current context, to the extent that for profit chains are perceived as aggressive and predatory by nonprofit hospitals. For profits, for example, may more aggressively compete for potentially profitable service lines or for managed care contracts. Consistent with this, Hoerger has demonstrated that nonprofit hospitals respond more slowly to exogenous shocks (Hoerger, 1991) . Likewise, for profit providers may possess other strategic advantages such as costs efficiencies. In either case, debt markets may charge a risk premium to nonprofit providers to reflect the risk associated with the presence of for profit competitors. Moreover, the same risks will also be associated with the entry of nonprofit chain providers, which may also possess some of the same strategic advantages. In either case, the net effect is a higher cost assigned to debt financing at any given level of leverage. This also causes the cost of capital schedule to shift upward at any given level of capital financing.
Information Asymmetries
A final factor that influences the cost of capital schedule is the existence of information asymmetries, particularly with regard to the quality of investment opportunities. The effects of information asymmetries on the cost of capital and capital structure have been explored previously (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Information asymmetries have also been linked, theoretically, to capital rationing where information asymmetries are related to the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) .
Information asymmetries are particularly relevant in the case of hospital and healthcare restructuring. This is because the projects that support restructuring (e.g., vertical or horizontal integration) are, by their nature, highly risky and uncertain. Financial markets account for uncertainty in setting the cost of capital. More importantly, to the extent that firms (hospitals) hold insider information about the quality of these projects, higher risk premiums will be charged for the use of external (e.g., debt) financing. This reflects the tendency of financial markets to adversely select the lowest quality capital projects for external financing.
It is reasonable to suppose that information asymmetries will disproportionately affect the cost of capital for nonprofit providers. First, nonprofits have few alternatives to the use of external sources of finance. Second, non-profits may be more subject to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that characterize financial markets. The basis of this argument is as follows. First, financial markets factor in the likelihood that borrowers try to fund risky projects with low expected returns. This behavior occurs most frequently, in turn, where there are barriers to capital exit. Finally, nonprofit hospitals, not associated with chains, face the greatest barriers to exit because their various stakeholders are unable to profit from merger, consolidation or liquidation. The important implication is that financial markets should be most suspicious of the motives (and insider information) of nonprofit organizations that seek to borrow large sums of capital during a period of healthcare restructuring.
(1) Given the limited utility non-profits assign to the financial alternatives of merger or closure, they will have a tendency to bring even low quality capital projects to market. Financial markets will rationally reflect this in the prices charged for capital financing.
The effects of information asymmetries on the hospital's cost of capital are easily understood. The cost of capital is shifted upward and a pronounced convexity may be in evidence even at low levels of borrowing. The current discussion also indicates that this effect will vary over time and by the hospital's membership in a chain. Chain membership may shift the point of convexity to the right. We hypothesize that the effects of information asymmetry are more aggravated for freestanding hospitals and have become increasingly evident over time.
Capital Market Imperfections and Restructuring
We now consider the implications of an upward-sloping cost of capital schedule for the likely path of healthcare restructuring. Our argument is as follows: If restructuring requires large amounts of capital acquisition, then an upward sloping cost of capital schedule may make restructuring infeasible for some organizations. As argued previously, the cost of capital schedule will slope upward most sharply for nonprofit hospitals and, within the universe of nonprofit hospitals, freestanding hospitals operating in competitive markets.
The substance of this argument is illustrated in Figure 1 . In Figure 1 , we graph two cost of capital schedules, CC1 and CC2, against the total amount of capital raised. The horizontal schedule applies to a for profit chain whereas the convex schedule applies to a nonprofit provider. As noted earlier, for profit providers enjoy specific advantages raising equity and communicating the value of their investment opportunities to capital markets. The horizontal schedule, while an approximation, may accurately describe their cost of capital over a wide range of capital expenditures. Non-profits, on the other hand, do not enjoy the same advantages as for profits and face a convex cost of capital schedule for reasons previously noted.
Under health care restructuring, large amounts of capital must be invested in order to make a hospital or health system financially viable. For example, large amounts of capital may be needed to support vertical or horizontal integration. This is illustrated by the curve "AR" in Figure 1 which depicts the average return on invested capital, before (gross of) capital costs. In our figure, positive net returns are enjoyed only at relatively high levels of capital investment. Intuitively, a hospital that does little investing may be unable to make positive profits in the future because it has little to sell other than its acute care services.
The dilemma faced by some nonprofit providers is also illustrated in Figure 1 . While positive gross returns on capital are realized only at relatively high levels of investment, at these levels of investment the cost 
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of capital is so prohibitively high that a negative net return on capital is still achieved. Indeed, it may be impossible for some nonprofit providers to make a positive net return on capital at any level of capital investment, because promising investment opportunities are associated with costly capital finance. The substance of this argument is illustrated by the curves NAR1 and NAR2 which depict the net average return to capital, after subtracting the average cost of capital. For example, schedule NAR1 measures capital returns, net of the average cost of capital, CC1. This curve is simply a downward vertical displacement of the AR curve and exhibits both a positive value and a maximum at investment level I. Hospitals that enjoy this cost of capital schedule can remain viable in the industry. On the other hand, curve NAR2 represents the net returns to an organization saddled with a convex cost of capital schedule. In this case, NAR2 represents the difference between the AR curve and the cost of capital curve, CC2. Here, there are no strategies associated with a positive net return. It can be argued, therefore, that an organization possessing this cost of capital schedule cannot restructure and cannot survive in its current form. (Presumably it will have to merge or close).
Effects of Capital Market Imperfections on "At Risk" Health Care Providers
We have identified four factors that affect the cost of capital schedule of nonprofit hospitals and, as a result, influence the future of health care restructuring. We conclude by considering the impact of these factors on the equilibrium capital structures of three different classes of hospital providers: (1) nonprofits that serve a large proportion of Medicaid and uninsured patients, (2) nonprofits unaffiliated with a chain and (3) nonprofit hospitals, chain and freestanding, relative to for-profit chains. This comparison serves the following purpose. If it can be shown that some organizational forms have equilibrium capital structures with less leverage, then it can also be inferred that their cost of capital schedules slope upward more quickly as well. This is because such organizations, by implication, exhaust their use of inexpensive debt financing more quickly than other organizations. Thus, a test of equilibrium capital structures constitutes an indirect test of the theory developed earlier.
Our discussion permits us to draw the following four conclusions on the relationship between ownership, market environment and equilibrium capital structure. The conclusions are as follows:
1. Capital costs should be higher and total leverage should be lower for freestanding nonprofit hospitals. This comparison holds relative to nonprofit chain hospitals. This reflects the superior ability of chain hospitals to diversify risk and less moral hazard in the pursuit of inefficient projects.
2. Market-determined factors such as Medicaid dependence and incidence of poverty increase risk and reduce the level of equilibrium leverage in nonprofit providers. However, the effect should be muted in nonprofit chains that, again, are better able to diversify the risk associated with these payer sources. The exception to this result is the case where Medicaid dependence and poverty reduce the hospital's net income and equity. In this case, an income effect may dominate and lead to higher leverage (temporarily). More is said about this below.
3. Conversely, Medicaid dependence and the incidence of poverty are means for accessing greater levels of tax-exempt financing. This offsets the disadvantages associated with Medicaid dependence and poverty incidence cited above. Again, the opposite finding holds if capital markets penalize hospitals for the risk associated with Medicaid dependence.
4. Finally, the presence of a for profit hospital or a chain provider increases the cost of capital and reduces the level of equilibrium leverage for nonprofit hospitals in the same market.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
In our empirical methodology we examine evidence of: (1) nonprofit freestanding and chain hospitals' use of debt, (2) nonprofit freestanding and chain hospitals' use of-tax-exempt debt, (3) the intermediating role that payer dependence and market area demographics play in the use of debt, (4) the extent to which the use of debt has changed over time and (5) the role that changing for profit presence in a market plays in the use of debt.
Research Design
The research design employs data from two sources and uses two distinct methodologies. In one methodology, data from the state of California are used to study the effects of organizational features and the market environment on the use of total debt and tax-exempt debt. A key study question is whether hospitals that are associated with chains or that operate in markets with a low incidence of poverty use greater amounts of debt and/or have superior access to tax-exempt debt markets. The California data are well suited for these purposes because of the size and heterogeneity of markets in the state and because the reported data permit a division of reported debt into taxable and tax-exempt categories. These data are studied at two distinct points in time in order to investigate whether leverage has changed over time.
In the second part of the work, data from the state of Florida are examined in order to measure the influence of for profit providers and multihospital systems (chains) in the marketplace on nonprofit capital structures. A key study question is the extent to which nonprofit providers operating in markets with a strong for-profit presence have reduced their use of leverage. Florida is particularly relevant in this regard because it has a relatively high percentage of for-profit providers that has also grown over time. The time series variation in for-profit market share is examined for this purpose. Time periods for the analysis of both data sets are chosen to optimize the level of time series variation in key variables for both states. For example, the time period chosen for the state of Florida is characterized by rapid entry of forprofit providers into local markets.
Data and Variables
The primary source of data for the state of California comes from the Annual Hospital Disclosure Report collected by the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). These reports contain most of the data needed for the tests, including data on flows of profits and debt financing. Of particular note is the detailed information provided on specific bond issuances, including issuance and maturity dates as well as the interest rates on each outstanding hospital bond. This information is used to create aggregate measures of taxable and tax-exempt bond holdings, by hospital and year as described below. The OSHPD data were also supplemented with data from the Area Resource File (ARF) to provide market-level information.
The primary data set for the Florida analysis comes from the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration. Financial data, including balance sheet and income statement data, are collected for the years 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993 . These data also contain the financial information required for the analysis, including measures of taxable and tax-exempt debt. The Florida data were also supplemented with data from the ARF and the American Hospital Association's (AHA's) Annual Survey of Hospitals.
Two dependent variables are analyzed in both state analyses. The first is a measure of total organizational leverage, defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, (TOTLEV). The maintained assumption is that organizations have historically targeted their leverage levels to minimize their cost of capital. (2) According to this interpretation, leverage levels are indicative of more than internal funding shortages and surpluses and also measure the organization's ability to bear risk without creating agency or other costs. Thus, higher levels of leverage, in equilibrium, are at least partially indicative of a greater capacity to raise overall capital. We also study each hospital's access to tax-exempt debt (TXEX). This is defined as the percentage of all debt that is composed of tax-exempt debt. Tax-exempt debt is a less costly source of debt financing. Thus, while (TXEX) may not measure the hospital's total access to capital, it is an effective measure of the cost of capital over the range in which the hospital can raise capital. Thus, it is also indicative of the cost of capital.
As noted, the overall purpose is to study the effects of chain membership as well as market risk factors on capital structure. In addition, the analysis of borrowing behavior over time also measures the extent to which nonprofit hospitals, generally, may be suffering reduced access to capital. The definition of chain membership (CHAIN) is based on the AHA definition of chain affiliation as reported in the AHA's annual survey of hospitals. It is hypothesized that hospital chains enjoy better access to capital given their superior ability to diversify risk and avoid problems related to moral hazard and agency. For this reason, the expected coefficient for this variable is positive in the regression of total leverage. The effects of chain membership on access to tax-exempt debt are unsigned theoretically, since both chain and freestanding facilities have the same legally defined access to this funding source. On the other hand, some previous work by the authors suggests that chain hospitals may be able to find ways to avoid the legal constraints associated with tax-exempt debt issuance.
The specifications also include several measures of the hospital's market environment to test how they affect access to capital. One set of environmental variables is designed to capture the effects of the local market's income and wealth on the hospital's access to capital. Included in this set of variables are measures of hospital Medicare dependence (MCR), Medicaid dependence, (MCD), market area income per capita (MIPC), percent of the market population below 200 percent of the poverty rate, (POV200) and accident rate (an exogenous proxy for the demand for charity care) (MACCD). It is hypothesized that hospitals operating in markets characterized by greater levels of poverty and less generous insurance coverage will have greater risk associated with any level of borrowing. Under this hypothesis, they will hold less leverage. On the other hand, the same variables may also be associated with lower hospital net income and hospital equity and hence a greater need for leverage to access investment opportunities. This effect, referred to as the "income effect", will cause leverage to grow, at least temporarily. Negative coefficients on measures of Medicaid and poverty are interpreted as support for a dominant risk effect; and positive coefficients, as support for a dominant income effect (and uncertain support for the risk hypothesis).
In addition to the hospital's market environment, there are also a number of other controls that, as shown in the authors' previous work, affect hospital leverage. These variables include total net fixed assets, (NFA), average asset age (AGE), average available beds, (ABED), teaching hospital dummy (COTH), average volatility of cash flows (VOLA) and, finally, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index for the hospital's market, (HHI). The expected signs of these variables in regressions of hospital leverage are briefly reviewed here. Measures of hospital size should increase the ability to diversify risk and take leverage so that positive signs are expected for net fixed assets and average beds in the regressions of total leverage. The same can be said for teaching hospitals. On the other hand, the average volatility of cash flows reduces the optimal amount of leverage, a prediction that is consistent with accepted corporate financial theory. Likewise, asset age also relates negatively to a hospital's leverage reflecting the fact that leverage moves cyclically with the pattern of hospital investment. Finally, the HirschmanHerfindahl index (HHI) is used to proxy the extent of market competition, with higher values of the HHI indicating less competition. It is hypothesized that less competition supports greater levels of debt capacity, so that the predicted sign of HHI is positive.
The same set of results is also predicted for the regressions of taxexempt debt with a couple of notable exceptions. Since tax-exempt debt is "project financing" (hospitals must have a qualifying project to access the debt) it is anticipated that net fixed assets and asset age will play an even stronger role in predicting the extent of tax-exempt. Their signs should remain positive and negative respectively, but should take on larger absolute magnitudes compared to regressions of total leverage. Variable definitions, means and standard deviations are provided in Table 1 .
Statistical Methods
The regressions using the California data use a simple cross sectional methodology defined at two distinct points in time, 1987 and 1991. The advantages of chain membership and other organizational features should be evident in data of this vintage. The data allow us to examine both the cross sectional determinants of leverage as well as trends in these variables over time. The analysis focuses on 171 voluntary, nonprofit acute care hospitals analyzed across both years.
The regressions of the Florida data are based on a slightly different methodology. The approach, in this case, is based in two overriding considerations: (a) the focus on the effects of changing for-profit presence on capital structure and (b) the need to augment the number of observations to gain an acceptable number of degrees of freedom. To address these concerns, a first-differenced, panel data design is employed, utilizing the years 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993 . Virtually all variables in design results in a tripling of the degrees of freedom and thus increases the power of all relevant tests.
The panel nature of the research design also raises certain econometric issues due to the likely covariances which will exist between the different observations of the same hospital. The standard approach, fixed or random effects, imposes strong restrictions about the nature of the autocorrelation between adjacent observations that may not be appropriate where data is first-differenced (Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Lutkepohl and Lee, 1985) . For this reason, the problem of auto-correlation is addressed by using a generalized least squares estimator corrected for first order autocorrelation (AR1). Tests of the residuals after this correction indicate that the estimator eradicates the serial correlation initially found in the data. the design are first differenced enabling us to highlight the effects of changing for-profit and chain presence on capital structure. Likewise, the panel data
RESULTS
Results from California Data
Based on the analysis of the California data, Table 2 provides the results of the regressions of total leverage and an analogous set of results for the percentage of debt which is tax-exempt. Regarding total leverage, consider the evidence pertinent to two questions:
1. What effect does chain affiliation have on total leverage? and 2. What effects do variables that measure the riskiness of the market environment, such as Medicaid share, poverty rates and competition have on total leverage?
The key effects of chain affiliation, as found in Table 2 , are as follows. First, affiliation with a chain increases leverage even after negative interactions with environmental variables are accounted for. Specifically, the coefficient for CHAIN is positive and significant in both years analyzed. In addition, the leverage of chain hospitals is less sensitive to environmental factors than the leverage of freestanding hospitals. The latter result follows from the fact that interactions of chain membership with environmental variables generally offset the coefficients of the environmental variables alone.
The interpretation is that chain hospitals enjoy greater debt capacity and thus a low c ost of capital at any leverage ratio. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that positive chain effect is an income effect which reflects the inability of chains to raise equity, since most available evidence suggests that chain hospitals are more profitable rather than less profitable than freestanding hospitals. Thus, the conclusion is that chains enjoy greater debt capacity and exploit this capacity.
Next, consider the effects of the market environment variables on leverage including the effects of MCAL, MCARE, HHI, MIPC, POV200 and the accident rate, MACCD. Note that, where the environmental effects are significant, they indicate that measures of market risk are associated with higher rather than lower leverage. Specifically, the coefficient of MCAL is positive and significant in both regressions while the accident rate, ACCD and the HHI have positive and negative significant effects respectively in one of the two regressions. Following the previous discussion, these findings provide evidence of a strong income effect. For example, Medicaid dependence may increase risk and the cost of capital, but if it is also associated with low net income (because it pays penuriously), then it may give rise to a greater need for leverage and result in higher leverage overall. This is the effect observed here. The evidence in Table 2 does little to prove or disprove the risk associated with these environmental variables given the dominance of income consideration. It is worth noting that the positive effects of Medicaid share and the accident rate on overall leverage diminish somewhat between 1987 and 1991. This may indicate that the risk associated with these environmental variables has increased, causing a reduction in desired leverage.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the results in Table 2 . First, chain hospitals enjoy more debt capacity than freestanding hospitals. Second, chain hospital leverage is less sensitive to the market environment than the leverage of freestanding hospitals. Finally, some variables that measure the risk of the market environment i ncrease leverage due to an income effect. However, this effect appears to be diminishing over time. Finally, each of these conclusions must be offered tentatively, given the number of years analyzed.
Regarding the regressions of tax-exempt debt as a percentage of overall debt, this percentage is crucial to the ability of nonprofit providers to compete on a "level" playing field with the for-profit sector. In analyzing these results, there is particular interest in the relationship between the hospital's market environment, measured by variables such as MCAL and POV200, and the hospital's ability to access tax-exempt debt. The crucial question is whether market environments characterized by high levels of Medicaid and poverty incidence help or hinder access to this form of financing.
In consideration of the results, a clear picture emerges. Medicaid dependence in particular, appears to be a liability rather than an asset in this regard, at least for freestanding hospitals. For example, the 1991 results indicate that a 20 percent dependence on Medicaid as a payer source reduces the percent of debt which is tax-exempt also by 20 percent. In 1991, Medicare dependence also appears to be a strategic disadvantage for the purposes of acquiring tax-exempt debt. Perhaps equally interesting, these effects appear to be perfectly offset in chain facilities, so that Medicaid and Medicare dependence do not reduce access to tax-exempt funding in chain hospitals.
Other controls in these regressions, particularly asset age and earnings volatility, work as expected. As assets age and tax-exempt debt is repaid, the percentage of debt which is tax-exempt falls. This result confirms the close linkage which exists between tax-exempt debt finance and fixed investment. Similarly, earnings volatility reduces the ability to access tax-exempt debt, a result which is consistent with some of the authors' earlier work (Wedig, Sloan, Hassan and Morrisey, 1988) .
The implications drawn from these results are important. Freestanding hospitals which are Medicaid dependent are disadvantaged rather than advantaged by their Medicaid dependence. However, chain hospitals do not appear to suffer this disadvantage. This provides yet another clear capitalrelated advantage for chain facilities. Table 3 presents the results for the change in hospital total leverage. The model presented earlier indicates that changes in for-profit and multihospital system penetration have a negative effect on hospital leverage due to increased risk caused by their strategic interaction with nonprofit hospitals. Turning to the results, consider first the coefficient on change in MHS penetration. While the coefficient measuring change in penetration is not significant, the coefficient on the level value of MHS penetration is negative and significant at the .10 level (albeit not significant at the more commonly used .05 level). This suggests that, over time, MHS penetration decreases the total leverage of hospitals in markets in which there is high MHS penetration. Next, we consider for-profit penetration. Both the change in and level of for-profit market penetration effects are negative. While insignificant, the negative signs are consistent with the hypothesized effects of increasing competition and the resulting effect on hospital debt levels.
Results From the Florida Data
Changes in hospital occupancy rate and Medicare percentage are also significant. The effect of changes in Medicare percentage is negative and significant at the .01 confidence level. This indicates that hospitals with high Medicare percentages have lower total leverage, perhaps due to the risk associated with Medicare sources of payment. Additionally, the coefficient on change in hospital occupancy rate is negative and significant at the .10 confidence level. This suggests that hospitals with high occupancy rates have lower debt. This is consistent with an income effect. Hospitals with high occupancy are expected to have more revenues to cover the fixed costs of operation. As such they have greater relative income and less need for capital to cover the fixed costs.
Given the results regarding the percentage of debt held by hospitals, the next study question focuses on the type of debt held. As non-profit organizations, these hospitals have the capacity to take on tax exempt-debt. Table 3 also presents the results of a model that predicts the percentage of tax-exempt debt. Three variables designed to capture the effect of market changes on tax-exempt debt percentage are significant: change in MHS market penetration, level of for-profit market penetration, and level of MHS market penetration. The effects of both change in MHS market penetration and level of for-profit penetration are negative and significant at the .10 and .01 significance levels respectively. The negative coefficient on change in MHS penetration indicates that as the market becomes more competitive, the hospital is less able to take on tax-exempt debt. This may be due to the increased risk associated with competitive markets. The impact of for-profit penetration is negative as well, suggesting that over time the effect of forprofit penetration is decreasing the percentage tax-exempt debt held by hospitals. The positive coefficient on the level of MHS penetration is unexpected in our model. Finally, the change in asset age is negative and significant at the .10 confidence level. This finding is consistent with the received literature on the relationship between debt age and percentage of tax-exempt debt.
DISCUSSION
The evolution of healthcare restructuring has been the subject of much recent discussion and commentary, with a particular focus on the roles of forprofit provision and system integration. If one accepts the premise that restructuring requires large capital expenditures, then the importance of capital market access is self-evident. Until now, the willingness of capital markets to supply needed capital has generally been assumed. This paper questions this assumption and considers the various ways in which capital markets may effectively guide the restructuring process.
A useful heuristic device for understanding the role of capital markets is the hospital's cost of capital schedule. Features of capital markets alter shape of this schedule and make it impossible for certain organizational forms to survive. Capital cost convexities will most likely affect those nonprofits that cannot raise sufficient levels of equity internally, especially freestanding nonprofits with a dependence of Medicaid, operating in risky markets. Taxexemptions, especially access to tax-exempt debt, provide a partial strategy to redress this disadvantage.
Where capital market access is decisive, the implications for healthcare restructuring may be profound. The implication is that future health systems will more likely be led by for-profit and chain hospital providers. This organizational feature, in turn, may have profound implications for the treatment of the uninsured.
The empirical results provide some of the first evidence of hypothetical capital market access problems. The key findings are as follows: (a) nonprofit chain hospitals access more leverage than freestanding hospitals. As explained above this probably reflects superior debt capacity rather than equity shortages. Moreover, overall leverage in chain hospitals is less sensitive to factors that influence market risk than freestanding hospital leverage; (b) tax-exempt debt access is not facilitated by Medicaid dependence, but is instead discouraged by it. However chain nonprofits do not suffer this disadvantages in accessing tax-exempt finance where they exhibit Medicaid dependence; Finally, (c) there is some evidence that forprofit and chain penetration increases the risk of borrowing for nonprofit hospitals, as evidenced by their declining leverage in penetrated markets. Overall, the general thrust of the results is consistent with a relative advantage for nonprofit chain providers as compared to freestanding providers, especially those freestanding providers operating in risky markets with a risky payer mix. These results are potentially damaging to freestanding hospitals if large amounts of capital are needed for hospital survival. However, it should be stressed that these conclusions are based on results from just two states and that further study is needed to ensure the robustness of these findings.
Future research on this topic may be aimed in several areas. First, where large capital expenditures are needed to sustain hospital viability, one can examine mergers and closures to confirm that those hospitals with capital market disadvantages are less likely to survive. Conversely, if one focuses on mergers or closures exclusively, it is possible to examine the extent to which capital rationing is to be implicated in these events. In either case, further insights may be gained into the future structure of the hospital marketplace.
NOTES
1. Lending for smaller projects may be less subject to these problems because: (a) smaller projects have more predictable returns and (b) smaller projects place less risk on the borrower since there is a smaller likelihood of bankruptcy.
2. The authors have uncovered a good deal of evidence to suggest that this is true. See, for example, Wedig et al. (1988) and Wedig, Hassan and Morrisey (forthcoming).
3. We also acknowledge that leverage may be driven by shortages of available equity. Organizations may be willing to take on higher leverage even at a high marginal cost if investment opportunities are relatively abundant. In our methodology section, we discuss strategies for separating the cash flow versus the risk determinants of leverage.
